INTRoDUCTIoN
Moderncryptographicprotocolsthatensurethesecurityoftransmittedmessageshaveahighresistance toburglary.Thestabilityofciphersisbasedonmathematicalformulationsandthelimitedcomputing resourcesoftheattacker.Itisbelievedthatuntilnowthemostreliablesecurityinthetransmissionof messagesprovidestheuseofone-timepads.Thedevelopmentofsymmetricmethodsofencryption islimitedtothemainprobleminthetransmissionofconfidentialinformation,whichisformulated astheproblemofdistributingasecretkeybetweenlegitimateusers.
Thewell-knownShannonrule,whichinterpretstheuseofasecretkeyforasecuretransmission, isupdatedwiththedevelopmentofnewtechnologiesfortheformationofsecretkeys.Thus,the achievementofabsolutesecrecyinthetransmissionofmessagesispossibleonlybysolvingthe problemofkeydistribution.
Thedevelopmentofmethodsofquantumcryptographytoensuresecurityintelecommunications systemsofinformationtransmissiontheoreticallyallowstoachieveabsolutesecrecyofciphers (Gisin etal.,2002) .Quantumcryptographyisbasedonthelawsofquantumphysicsandisbasedonthe codingofthequantumstateofasingleparticle.Theessenceofquantumcryptographyliesinthe reliabledistributionofthesecretkeybetweenlegitimateusers.Anothercomponentinthequantum distributionisthecreationofarandomsecretkey (Bennetetal.,1992; Stuckietal.,2002; Broadbent &Schaffner,2007) . Practicalimplementationofquantumcryptographyisbasedonquantumkeydistributionsystems (QKDS) .Iftheexistingencryptionalgorithmscanbedistortedbymathematicalimprovements,then quantumcryptographyistheonlywaytosolvetheproblemofkeydistribution.Recallthatthebasis of quantum cryptography lies in the following statements: it is impossible to clone an unknown quantumstateanditisimpossibletoobtaininformationonnon-orthogonalquantumstateswithout perturbation.Consequently,anyunauthorizedmeasurementwillleadtoachangeinthequantumstate.
In quantum cryptography, symmetric cryptosystems are common (Makarov, 2007) . In such systems,onekeyisusedforbothencryptionanddecryption.Messagessentalongthelinesofquantum communication,theoreticallycan'tbeinterceptedorcopied.Quantumkeydistributionisatechnology basedonthelawsofquantumphysicstocreateasequenceofrandombitsintworemoteusers.This sequenceisusedasacryptographickey,andthekeyarrayitselfiscalleda"one-timepad.
QUANTUM Key DISTRIBUTIoN SySTeMS
In2007,themethodsofquantumcryptographywerefirstappliedinalarge-scaleproject.Quantum securitysystem,developedbytheSwisscompanyidQuantique,wasusedtotransmitvotingdataat theparliamentaryelectionsinGeneva.Todate,reallyfunctioningquantumcommunicationsystems have been created. The efforts of developers are now aimed at increasing the communication range,increasingthespeedofformingaquantumkey,improvingthecharacteristicsoffiber-optic components.
As noted earlier, a symmetric cryptosystem generates a shared secret key and distributes it amonglegitimateuserstoencryptanddecryptmessages (Rumyantsev&Pijokin,2015) .Anattacker attempting to investigate transmitted data can't measure photons without distorting the original message.Thesystemontheopenchannelcomparesanddiscussessignalstransmittedonthequantum channel,therebyverifyingthemforthepossibilityofinterception.Ifthesystemdoesnotcontain errors,thenthetransmittedinformationcanbeconsideredsecurelydistributedandsecret,despiteall thetechnicalcapabilitiesthatacryptanalystcanuse.
Quantumkeydistributionsystemsoperateunderthecontrolofquantumprotocols.Thereare severalprotocolsofquantumcryptographybasedonthecodingofsinglephotonstates,forexample: BB84,B92, Koashi-Imoto,SARG04andtheirmodifications(Kurochkinetal.,2012) .Underthesignal inquantumcommunicationsystemsismeantthetransmittedquantumstateofaphoton.Thefirst protocolthatwasimplementedintheQKDsystemsiscalledBB84.ThebasisoftheBB84protocol istheprinciplesofparticlephasecodingandauto-compensationofpolarizationdistortions.This protocolisalsocalledbi-directionalbecauseofthepropagationoftheopticalsignalalongasingle fiber-opticpathintwodirections.NotethattodaytheBB84protocolhasmoreefficientmodifications. IntheknownBB84protocol,thereceiveranalyzesthephotonsandrandomlyselectsthepolarization measurementmethod.Onanunprotectedchannel,thereceiverinformsthesenderofthemethodof choosingthebasisforeachphoton,withoutrevealingthemeasurementresultsthemselves.Afterthat, thesenderonanunprotectedchanneltellsyouwhetherthetypeofmeasurementforeachphotonis correctlyselected.Asaresult,anunrefined(raw)keyisgenerated.
SyNCHRoNIZATIoN IN QKD SySTeM
The QKD system can't operate without synchronization (Lydersen et al., 2010 Theenergymodelofthesystemmadeitpossibletocalculatethepowerlossofopticalpulseon allsectionsofthefiber-opticsignalpropagationpath (Pijokin&Rumyantsev,2016) .Thelattershows thatduringthesynchronization(detectionofatimeintervalwithanopticalpulse),thesignaloptical pulsecontainsmorethan10 3 photonsinbackpropagationfromthecodingstationtothetransceiver. Notethatthetransmissionofsynchronizingsignalsfromthetransceiverstationtothecodingoneis always performed in multiphoton mode. In addition, it is established that avalanche photodiodes functioninthelinearmodeduringsynchronization,andtheproceduresforerrorcorrectionandpower control(asintheoperationofthequantumprotocol)arecompletelyabsent.
Thus,itcanbeconcludedthatthesynchronizationprocessinquantumkeydistributionsystems withautomaticcompensationofpolarizationdistortionstakesplaceinamultiphotonmodeanddoes nothavemeansofprotectionagainstunauthorizedaccess.
ATTACK oN THe QUANTUM CHANNeL eXPeRIMeNTS
Note that back in 2007, a group of scientists successfully carried out an attack on the quantum key distribution system with phase coding (Rumyantsev & Pijokin, 2016) . The attack was based on imperfection of the system and was aimed at destabilizing the quantum protocol. During the implementationoftheattack,itwasassumedthatthesystemwasalreadysynchronized.
Letusprovethatthevulnerabilityofthesynchronizationprocesscanbeusedtofurtherinterfere withtheoperationofthequantumkeydistributionsystematthestageoffunctioningofthequantum protocol. Multiphoton mode potentially allows an attacker to organize unauthorized access to a fiberopticcommunicationchannel(toaquantumchannel).Thepurposeofunauthorizedaccesscanbe notonlytheinterceptionandreadingofinformation,butalsothesynchronizationoftheequipment oftheattackerwiththeaimofinterferingwiththeoperationoftheQKDsystem.Attack"Trojan horse"isanexampleoftheclosesttopracticalimplementation,whenitispossibletoreplacethe originalmessageswithanattacker'smessages.Theattackerconnectstothequantumcommunication channelandgeneratescopiesofopticalpulsesinterceptedfromthetransceiverstationandthensent totheencodingstation.Thus,legitimateuserscannotrecognizethepresenceofanattackerina quantumcommunicationchannel.Realizedauto-compensationsystemswithphasecodingofphoton statesfunctionaccordingtoatwo-passscheme,i.e.opticalsignalspropagatealongasinglefiber inbothdirections.Sucharealizationcomplicatestheproblemofunauthorizedaccesstoaquantum communicationchannelbutdoesnotcompletelyexcludeit.Themomentofinterceptionoftheoptical pulse during direct propagation of the signal does not give complete information to the attacker abouttheoperationofthesystem.Thedecisivemomentistheappearanceofanopticalpulseinthe backwardpropagationofareflectedsignalinaquantumchannel.Havinginformationaboutthetime ofre-reflection,theattackerisabletosimulatetheworkoftheencodingstationandattherighttime sendimitationsignalstothephotodetectorsofthetransceiverstation.
Figure3(a)showstheschemeoftheexperimentwithanopticalpowercouplerintegratedinto thequantumcommunicationchannel.Coefficientsofdivision90/10(%).10%ofthepowerofoptical radiationisdivertedtothemeasuringequipmentwithadirectsignalpassing(fromthetransceiver stationtothecodingone).90%aresenttothecodingstation.Atbackwardpropagationthesignal withoutlossesarrivesatthetransceiverstation.Withthismodification,notonlythesynchronization process,butalsotheprocessofquantumkeydistribution(quantumprotocol)functionintheregular mode.Thetheoreticalerror,whichiscalculatedbythesoftwareoftheQKDsystem,was2.85%.The actualerrorwas0.65%.Notethatthevaluesobtainedarenotcritical;thesystemdoesnotdetectthe removalofpartoftheopticalpowerfromthequantumcommunicationchannel. Letusrealizetheproblemofremovingpartoftheopticalpowerattwopointsofthequantum communicationchannel.Forthispurpose,acircuitwasconstructedusingtwodirectionalfiber-optic couplerswithdivisioncoefficientsof85/15(%)and70/30(%).Thecouplersareintegratedinthe quantumcommunicationchannelasshowninFigure3(b). Toprovethethesisthattheopticalfiberelementsofthecodingstationareinactiveduringthe synchronizationprocess,wewillconductthefollowingexperiment:duringthedetectionofthelength ofthefiber-opticcommunicationline,wedetachthetransceiverstationfromthequantumchanneland givetheopticalpulse0dBmtotheinputofthe85/15couplerinthedirectionofthecodingstation. Atthesametime,wecapturethevaluesattheoutputsofthecouplers15%and30%--9.6dBmand -57.7dBm,respectively.Werepeatthemeasurements,butthecodingstationisde-energizedthistime. Thevaluesattheoutputsofthecouplersof15%and30%are-9.6dBmand-57.7dBm,respectively. Thus,theexperimentalresultsshowthattheactivefiber-opticelementsofthecodingstationarenot involvedinthesynchronizationprocessanddonotaffecttheopticalsignal.
As noted earlier, the attacker's task may be not only to intercept and decrypt information transmittedviathequantumcommunicationchannel,butalsotointroduceinterferencetodestabilize thesystem.Wewillexperimentallyprovethepossibilityofintroducinginterferenceintotheoperation ofthequantumprotocol,withoutdetectingthepresenceofanattackerinthequantumcommunication channel.
InaccordancewiththeschemepresentedinFigure3(b),wewillintegratefiber-opticcouplers intoafiber-opticcommunicationlinebetweentwostationsoftheQKDsystem.Thefirststageof the experiment is organized using a quantum communication channel with a length of 1000 m. Theoperationofthequantumkeydistributionsystemisstartedintheregularmode.Accordingto thealgorithmofwork,thesystemsubsequentlyteststhelaserdiodeandphotodetectors,analyzes the value of losses in the fiber-optic communication line. After the system analysis, the process of detecting the length of the quantum communication channel (synchronization) Wenotethatsimilarstudiesinrelatedfieldsarealsorelevant (Rumyantsev&Pijokin,2015; Pijonkin,2017; Pijokinetal.,2017; Yuen,2016; Pijonkinetal.,2016; Distribution,2010; Chanet al.,2011; AdvancedinSecurityandPrivacy…,2018; Botnet-baseddistributeddenialofservice…, 2012; AIZainetal.,2015; Guptaetal.,2016; Guptaetal.,2017; Bushanetal.,2017; Guptaetal., 2017; Aakankshaetal.,2017; Shashanketal.,2017) .
CoNCLUSIoN
Thus, it is proved that if an intruder enters the quantum communication channel at the stage of configuringaQKDsystem,theattackermayremainunnoticedduringsynchronizationandduring theformationofthequantumkey.Thelattermakesitpossibletointerferewiththeoperationof theQKDsystemwithoutrevealingitspresence.Theresultsoftheexperimentshowthatitisnot necessaryforanattackertohaveexpensiveequipmentforinterceptinganddecryptingquantumkeys. Thepresenceofstandardopticalpowercouplersandaccesstothefiber-opticcommunicationlines betweenthestationsoftheQKDsystemallowstointerferewiththesystemoperationattherequired time,whileremainingunnoticed.
The results of experimental studies allow us to formulate concrete conclusions about the vulnerabilityofthesynchronizationprocessoftheQKDsystem:duringthesynchronization,theactive nodesofthecodingstationareinactiveand,therefore,thealgorithmsforensuringtheprotectionand controloftheopticalsyncpulsearenotfunctioning;thetransmissionofopticalsignalsiscarried outinmultiphotonmode,whichallowsanattackertoremoveapartoftheopticalpowerfromthe quantumcommunicationchannel,remainingundetected;anattackerhasenoughtypicalfiberoptic equipmenttointerferewiththeoperationofthesystematthestageofquantumkeydistribution, whileremainingunnoticedforcontrol.
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